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Abstract:  
 
Theories often explain intra-party competition based on electoral conditions 
and intra-party rules. We further open this black box by considering intra-party 
statements of preferences. In particular, we predict that intra-party preference 
heterogeneity increases after electoral losses, but candidates deviating from the 
SDUW\¶VPHGLDQreceive fewer intra-party votes. Party members grant candidates 
greater leeway to accommodate competing policy demands when in government. We 
test our hypotheses with a new database of party congress speeches from Germany 
and France and XVHDXWRPDWHGWH[WFODVVLILFDWLRQWRHVWLPDWHVSHDNHUV¶UHODWLYH
preferences. The results demonstrate that speeches at party meetings provide 
YDOXDEOHLQVLJKWVLQWRDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGLQWUD-party politics. We find evidence 
of a complex relationship between governing context, the economy and intra-party 
disagreement.  
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Theories of party politics often make strong assumptions about the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶ behavior and the preferences of intra-party actors. For 
example, scholars frequently assume that parties act as if they are unitary actors and 
WKDWWKHSDUW\OHDGHUUHSUHVHQWVWKHPHGLDQSUHIHUHQFHVRIWKHSDUW\¶VPHPEHUVKLS
Despite substantial theoretical development and a number of detailed case studies, 
few cross-national analyses of intra-party politics consider the role of intra-party 
preferences.1 This absence is striking. Intra-party politics and party preferences hold 
implications for a large range of political processes such as election campaigns, 
legislative politics and coalition governance.2 
Building on these studies, we develop a theory of intra-party preferences and 
party leader selection by considering experiences in government and intra-party 
electoral rules. Broadly, we theorize that SDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOFRQWH[WLQIOXHQFHVWKH
SDUW\¶VLQWHUQDOSUHIHUHQFHGLYHUVLW\ We then DUJXHWKDWFDQGLGDWHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRI
preferences influence their intra-party electoral success. Candidates that express 
SUHIHUHQFHVFORVHUWRWKHSDUW\¶VLGHRORJLFDOFHQWHUDWWUDFWPRUHYRWHVWKDQPRUH
extreme candidates.  
To empirically test hypotheses from our theory, we create a new data set of 
intra-party actor preferences from their statements at party national congresses. By 
focusing on speeches at intra-party meetings, we begin to break open the black box 
of intra-party politics. Despite evidence that parties act as if they are internally 
divided in parliament, few studies seek to directly, quantitatively analyze the 
                                                 
1 For prominent counter examples see Laver and Shepsle 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; 
Adams 1999; Debus and Bräuninger 2008; Kenig 2009a and 2009b, Lehrer 2012; Philippov and Rahat 
2013; Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013. 
2 Laver 1999; McElwain 2007; Meguid 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009; Spoon 2011; Ceron 2012 and 
2013. 
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preferences of actors outside of this arena.3 Historically, intra-SDUW\DFWRUV¶
preferences have proven complicated to measure. Limited data has created a major 
hurdle in testing theories of intra-party politics. We overcome this hurdle by using 
DFWRUV¶ speeches at meetings of party national congresses. Like recent research 
studying political documents,4 we use automated text analysis to measure the relative 
location of intra-SDUW\DFWRUV¶VWDWHPHQWVRISUHIHUHQFHVE\DQDO\]LQJ their speeches 
DWSDUWLHV¶FRQJUHVVHVWe apply the scaling method WORDFISH5 WRHVWLPDWHDFWRUV¶
ideological positions and the distance between actors within the party. This method 
DOORZVXVWRFRPSDUHDFWRUV¶UHODWLYHVWDWHPHQWVRISUHIHUHQFHVDFURVVPXOWLSOH
political settings. We then use these estimates to study the relationship between intra-
party disagreement and experiences in government and elections. In a second 
analysis, we predict party leadership elections at national congresses from the 
UHODWLYHORFDWLRQRIVSHDNHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV 
The results from our analysis are consistent with an explanation of intra-party 
SROLWLFVIRFXVHGRQWKHSDUW\¶VLQWHUQDOUXOHVand electoral context. Likewise, the 
results indicate that our measures provide meaningful estimates of the location of 
intra-SDUW\DFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVWKDWFDQEHDGDSWHGWRILWQXPHURXVUHVHDUFKJRDOV
More broadly, we find evidence of a complex relationVKLSEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDO
performance, experiences in government and intra-party division. 
In the following section, we discuss previous studies of intra-party politics 
and leadership selection before considering previous approaches to studying actorV¶
preferences. We then describe the role of party congresses in political party behavior 
and outline our empirically testable hypotheses predicting two dependent variables: 
                                                 
3 see Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013 or Ceron 2012 and 2013 for prominent counter-examples. 
4 Slapin and Proksch 2008; Ceron 2012 and 2013; Proksch and Slapin 2012. 
5 Slapin and Proksch 2008. 
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intra-party division and party leadership selection. Following a discussion of our data 
FROOHFWLRQDQGDSSURDFKZHLOOXVWUDWHGLIIHUHQFHVLQSDUWLHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUWLPH
and show how the positions of individual party actors are linked to leadership 
VHOHFWLRQVDWWKHSDUWLHV¶QDWLRQDOFRQJUHVVHV7KHUHVXOWVIURPboth sets of analyses 
provide important insights into the study of political party behavior and offer a new 
approach for scholars to understand and measure intra-SDUW\DFWRUV¶VWDWHPHQWVRI
preferences.  
 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTRA-PARTY POLITICS 
 
Researchers show that political pDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRU
understanding electoral behavior and government outcomes. Little consensus exists 
surrounding the intra-party process that \LHOGVSDUWLHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRISUHIHUHQFHV such 
as election manifestos. Scholars have previously considered intra-party politics from 
spatial or organizational perspectives. 
Many studies from a spatial perspective assume that party leaders represent 
WKHPHGLDQSUHIHUHQFHVZLWKLQWKHSDUW\RUWKDWWKHOHDGHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVH[HPSOLI\WKH
broader organizDWLRQ¶VJRDOV6 The relative location of SDUWLHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRI
preferences is frequently considered to be strategically chosen or selectively 
emphasized to maximize the votes the party receives in an election.7 They argue that 
parties selectively emphasize their preferences to attract voters who in return select 
parties which they expect will be most likely to implement their policy goals.8  
                                                 
6 Downs 1957; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002. 
7 see for example Downs; 1957; Adams 1999. 
8 Downs 1957; Adams 1999; Adams and Merrill 1999, 2005 and 2006; Tsebelis 2002; Adams et al. 
2006; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Adams et al. 2009; Carey 2009; Kam 2009. 
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Spatial theories frequently rely on the assumption that parties act as if they 
are unitary actors. This assumption requires that the intra-party organizational 
SURFHVVJHQHUDWLQJSDUWLHV¶ campaign messages does not have a direct impact on their 
exact location. These theories treat party organizations as black boxes in which their 
leaders and statements of preferences are chosen for strategic electoral or policy 
motivated reasons.9 While spatial theories do not uniformly require parties to behave 
as unitary actors,10 clear evidence shows WKDWSDUWLHV¶HOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDFW
counter to the parties¶JRDOVLQQXPHURXVsettings.11 Members of parliament 
IUHTXHQWO\H[KLELWGLYHUVHRSLQLRQVZKLFKGRQRWFRUUHVSRQGWRWKHSDUW\OHDGHUV¶
preferences on roll call votes12 and their speeches in parliament.13 Party leaders use 
parliamentary procedures and the benefits of office to maintain party unity in 
parliament,14 although members of parliament also have opportunities to publically 
dissent from the party line.15 
Few studies, however, directly analyze intra-party politics and their influence 
RQSDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHV, although empirical research of parliamentary behavior 
demonstrates that intra-party divisions frequently constrain party leaders.16 
Representatives from the same party regularly deviate from the preferences of the 
SDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSLQHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVDQGLQWKHLUEHKDYior in parliament.17 
                                                 
9 Strøm 1990. 
10 Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Debus and Bräuninger 2008. 
11 see for example Hug and ScKXO]2¶%ULHQDQG6KRPHU 
12 Huber 1996; Hug and Schulz 2007; Carrubba et al. 2008; Clinton and Lapinski 2008; Ceron 2013. 
13 Bernauer and Bräuninger 2009; Proksh and Slapin 2012. 
14 Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005; Huber 1996; Döring 2003; Ceron 2013. 
15 Huber 1996; Rosas and Shomer 2008. 
16 Bowler et al. 1999; Laver 1999; Carey 2009; Kam 2009. 
17 McElwain 2007; Meguid 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009; Ceron 2012 and 2013. 
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Scholars assume party leaders generally receive the support from large majorities of 
intra-party supporters, but internal party competitors may be able to mobilize the 
support of groups with diverse political interests within the party. Modern, catch-all 
parties frequently assemble diverse political supporters, each of which would prefer 
WKHLUSROLF\JRDOVDVWKHSDUW\¶VSULRULW\18 
Scholars of party organizations instead study intra-party politics through the 
lens of internal institutional rules. These studies show that intra-party organizational 
characteristics such as the method of leadership selection, changes in party 
memberships DQGFKDQJHLQIDFWLRQDOGRPLQDQFHLQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRI
preferences.19 For example, Harmel and Janda theorize that party leadership selection 
DQGIDFWLRQDOGRPLQDQFHLQIOXHQFHWKHSDUW\¶VSUHIHUHQFHV20 Under contexts that lead 
to changes in leadership and the dominant faction, such as large electoral losses or 
exogenous shocks, the parW\¶VPHVVDJHDlso likely changes.21 Kitschelt adds that 
H[SHULHQFHVLQJRYHUQPHQWDQGHOHFWRUDOUHVXOWVLQIOXHQFHWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRISDUWLHV¶
membership and that this eventually impacts the long term direction of the 
leadership.22 However, dynamics in numerous democracies have caused parties to 
rely less on their memberships for running electoral campaigns. As a consequence, 
parties have become more hierarchically organized.23 Furthermore, parties that 
provide greater influence to party members and voters in leadership selection attract 
                                                 
18 Kirchheimer 1990. 
19 Ceron 2012. 
20 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
21 Janda et al. 1994; Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003; Hazan and Rahat 2006; Kenig 2009b. 
22 Kitschelt 1989. 
23 Tan 1997; Van Biezen et al. 2012 
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a larger number of candidates for office, but fewer intra-party candidates receive 
most of the votes.24 
Both spatial and organizational perspectives have given us substantial insights 
into preferences and party politics. Little research from either perspective, however, 
directly studies the causes and consequences of intra-party preference heterogeneity. 
In the following sections, we propose a theory linking the range of intra-party 
preferences to their electoral context and consider the implications of intra-party 
preferences for party leadership selection.  
 
THE CAUSES OF INTRA-PARTY HETEROGENEITY 
 Intra-party preference heterogeneity holds important implications for a range 
of political outcomes. Studying its causes will allow us to better understand the 
decision-PDNLQJSURFHVVOHDGLQJWRSDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQDQGSROLF\EHKDYLRU,QJHQHUDO
ZHSURSRVHWKDWWKHSDUW\¶VHOHFWRUDODQGJRYHUQPHQWDOSHUIRUPDQFHLQIOXHQFHVLQWUD-
party politics.  
Like previous research on party change,25 we expect that there are numerous 
factors that likely influence intra-party politics and the information party leaders 
have about the distribution of preferences within the party. Scholars have theorized 
that major events, such as elections or losing government positions will alter SDUWLHV¶
internal composition and rules. Kitschelt suggests that experience in government and 
previous electoral results influence the types of activists, supporters and politicians 
that join parties.26 Similarly, Przeworski and Sprague find thaW6RFLDOLVWSDUWLHV¶
internal organizational structures became more hierarchical as they gained 
                                                 
24 Kenig 2009b. 
25 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
26 Kitschelt 1989. 
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experience in office.27 Harmel and Janda add that major electoral defeats provide the 
opportunity for changes in factional dominance.28  
 Building on these studies, we predict electoral success and experience in 
government influence intra-party politics. Parties that are electorally successful likely 
DWWUDFWPRUHSUDJPDWLFVXSSRUWHUVKRSLQJWREHQHILWIURPWKHSDUW\¶VDFFHVVWR
government.29 6RORQJDVWKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSPDLQWDLQVHOHFWRUDOVXSSRUWLQWUD-
SDUW\FRPSHWLWRUVZLOOEDQGZDJRQRUOLQNWKHPVHOYHVWRWKHOHDGHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQVWR
curry favor with the leader and groups within the party. Due to this pragmatic 
bandwagon behavior, intra-party disagreements are likely to be limited when the 
leadership attracts sufficient electoral support for the party.  
However, competition between groups within the party increases when one 
faction or group sees an opportunity to expand its influence. Following electoral 
defeat, intra-party groups place the blame on the dominant party leaders and factions 
for these losses.30 7RFOHDUO\GLVWLQJXLVKWKHPVHOYHVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVOHDGHU¶V
reputation, challengers arise within the party who offer distinct alternatives from the 
FXUUHQWOHDGHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHV/DUJHHOHFWRUDOGHIHDWVOHDGgroups to challenge the 
SDUW\OHDGHUV¶ preferences WRGLIIHUHQWLDWHWKHPVHOYHVIURPWKHSDUWLHV¶SUHYLRXV
direction. This logic leads us to our first hypothesis that predicts intra-party 
disagreement increases in response to electoral loss.  
 
H1) Electoral losses increase intra-party disagreement. 
 
                                                 
27 Przeworski and Sprague 1986. 
28 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
29 Kitschelt 1989. 
30 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
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Furthermore, wHDGGWKDWSDUWLHV¶H[SHULHQFHLQJRYHUQPHQWLQIOXHQFHVintra-
party heterogeneity. The longer a party stays in office, the higher the likelihood that a 
world event or crisis occurs that forces leaders to make unpopular policy decisions.31 
Parties with long term successes in government become filled with actors with more 
disparate and pragmatic policy goals,32 but they stick with the party leader because 
their primary interest is to stay in power. Furthermore, economic conditions and 
coalition governance encourages compromises on a diverse set of policies.33 
Perceptions of government accountability and competence may influence the intra-
party distribution of preferences and factional dominance. Negative evaluations of 
WKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSDOVR encourage challenges WRWKHSDUW\¶VGLUHFWLRQ.  
Like studies of economic voting, we assume that voters hold parties 
accountable for the economy.34 As the most salient topic and ideological cleavage in 
most modern democracies, the economy provides a clear measure of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVXFFHVV:HDUJXHWKDWSDUty members and intra-party challengers also 
use the economy to evaluate WKHSDUW\¶VFRPSHWHQFLHVDQGSRSXODULW\ Challengers 
are unlikely to distinguish themselves from the current leadership when the party is 
perceived to be performing well.35 On the other hand, intra-party groups will express 
their discontent with the paUW\¶VGLUHFWLRQZKHQWKHSXEOLFperceives the party as 
incompetent or unaccountable.  
7KHHIIHFWRISHUFHSWLRQVRIFRPSHWHQFHGHSHQGVRQSDUWLHV¶SRVLWLRQLQ
government or the opposition. We predict that party members hold their own leaders 
                                                 
31 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010. 
32 Kitschelt 1989. 
33 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Green and Jennings 2012b; Martin and Vanberg 2011. 
34 Lewis-Beck and Stemaier 2000; Anderson 2007. 
35 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
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to a different standard when they control the cabinet. To govern effectively, leaders 
require flexibility to cope with changing world events.36 So long as the party 
maintains access to government, party leaders emphasize their policy successes and 
the rewards of office. Leaders can also blame deviations from intra-party preferences 
on voter demands.37 Evidence suggests that party members hold realistic 
H[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHJRYHUQPHQWOHDGHUV¶DELOLW\WRHQDFWXQFRPSURPLVHGSROLFLHV
government participation forces them to respond to voters, adhere to budgetary 
constraints and compromise with coalition partners to stay in office.38 Furthermore, 
members of governmental parties place additional value on supporting the party 
leader, since their continued participation in government demands internal support.39  
$OWRJHWKHUWKLVLPSOLHVWKDWWKHDELOLW\WRFKDOOHQJHWKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSLV
limited in government. Unlike voters, party members value intra-party unity and 
support the leadership when it is in government. We predict that party members 
support their leadership despite poor economic conditions. This leads to fewer 
VSHDNHUVSURSRVLQJDOWHUQDWHGHYLDWLRQVIURPWKHSDUW\OHDGHUVKLS¶VJRDOVRUOHVV
internal disagreement.  
 With few governing rewards for leaders to counterbalance negative 
perceptions, members of parties in the opposition become less forgiving of broad 
perceptions of incompetence. Studies of issue competition show that voters perceive 
SDUWLHV¶FRPSHWHQFLHVDVFRQQHFWed. When the economy performs well, voters 
                                                 
36 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010. 
37 See for example Carey 2009; Kam 2009.  
38 Kitschelt 1989; Seyd and Whitely 1990; Harmel and Janda 1994. 
39 See for example, Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005; Huber 1996; Döring 2003; Ceron 2013; 
Kenig Philippov and Rahat 2013. Parties in government may also require internal support in the face 
of votes of confidence.  
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perceive opposition parties as less competent and government parties as more 
competent.40 Perceptions of incompetent or unpopular leaders create the opportunity 
for entrepreneurial party members to influence the paUW\¶VSROLF\GLUHFWLRQ%\
H[SUHVVLQJDOWHUQDWHSUHVFULSWLRQVSDUW\PHPEHUVKRSHWRGUDZWKHSDUW\¶VSROLFLHVLQ
their preferred direction. Party members might express competing strategies for 
future policy success, such as incremental versus pure policy approaches, given 
uncertainty about future electoral successes.41 Therefore, the range of preferences 
expressed at national meetings likely increases for opposition parties when the 
economy performs strongly. A weak economy leads the range of preferences at the 
party meeting to shrink, as the party leadership benefits from improved voter 
perceptions. We summarize this logic in the following hypotheses.  
 
H2a) In the opposition, positive economic performance increases intra-party 
disagreement. 
 
H2b) In government, poor economic performance does not increase intra-
party disagreement. 
 
In general, we predict that intra-party disagreement increases when the party 
is perceived to have failed, but rallies around party leaders when they are in 
government.  In particular we predict that perceptions of incompetence among party 
members develop when a party has just lost an election or for opposition parties 
when the sitting government benefits from a strong economy. Building on this 
                                                 
40 Green and Jennings 2012a and 2012b. 
41 Kitschelt 1989. 
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approach, we argue in the next section that the outcome of party leadership elections 
depends on these statements of preferences as well as their broader election context.  
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERGENT PREFERENCES 
 
 We theorize that the causes of intra-party preference heterogeneity are linked 
WRSDUWLHV¶H[SHULHQFHLQJRYHUQPHQW7KHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIGLYHUJHQWLQWUD-party 
SUHIHUHQFHVDOVRKROGLPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSDUWLHV¶OHDGHUVKLSV%uilding on 
both the spatial and organizational perspectives, we theorize that political parties are 
dynamic organizations. $VRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKHSDUWLHV¶ leaderships depend on the 
support of intra-party groups to stay in power.42 Recent reforms that increased intra-
SDUW\GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQRYHUWKHSDUW\¶Vleadership selection, however, decreased the 
degree of internal competition. More candidates compete, but fewer candidates 
perform well.43 Like parliaments and other organizations, we expect that the internal 
distribution of preferences influences LQWHUQDOYRWHVIRUWKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQG
outputs.  
Spatial theories assume that party leaders will hold preferences somewhere 
FORVHWRWKHSDUW\¶VPHGLDQSRVLWLRQ.44 We expect that the rules for selecting leaders 
likely influence the specific leaders chosen DQGOHDGHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVIRUPDNLQJ
statements of preferences.45 Although the rules for selecting party leaders differ 
                                                 
42 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
43 Kenig 2009b. 
44 Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002. 
45 Innovative research by Kenig (2009a and 2009b) also focuses on the role of intra-party rules on 
OHDGHUVKLSVHOHFWLRQVKRZLQJWKDWWKHVL]HRIWKHOHDGHUVKLS¶VVHOHFWRUDWHLQIOXHQFHVWKHQXPEHURI
candidates and degree of competition within the party for leadership positions.  
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across parties, we predict WKDWHOHFWLRQVIRUWKHSDUW\¶VWRSOHDGHUVKLSSRVLWLRQZLOO
UHIOHFWFRPSHWLWLYHG\QDPLFVPXFKOLNH'RZQV¶expectations for plurality based 
elections.46 From this perspective, party leaders selected using plurality based 
election rules are likely soPHZKHUHFORVHWRWKHSDUW\¶VPHdian ideological position.  
In most parties, there can only be one top party leader; the candidate with the 
most votes wins. However, prominent examples exist in which parties divide over 
multiple candidates. Take for example, the French Parti Socialiste in the early 1990s. 
At the Congrès de Rennes, three candidates each received approximately just over a 
TXDUWHURIWKHSDUW\¶VYRWH47 A single faction or group may dominate parties for an 
extended period of time, but changes to the distribution of intra-party factions may 
increase the uncertainty over which facWLRQJDLQVWKHSDUW\¶VVXSSRUW.48 In addition to 
a single top leader, many parties also have multitier structures that include 
committees of various sizes that assist the elected party leader. 
We argue that candidates for the party leadership signal the relative location 
of their preferences to build support within the party.49 Applying this logic to intra-
party politics, two candidates under plurality election rules will emphasize 
SUHIHUHQFHVFORVHWRWKHPHGLDQYRWHU¶VSRVLWLRQ,Qthis context, the candidate that 
gains support from the median voter wins the election. Candidates for the party 
OHDGHUVKLSZLOOVLJQDOWKDWWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHVDUHFORVHWRWKHPHGLDQSDUW\PHPEHU¶V
position.  
Rational leadership candidates would select the median position if they only 
valued winning intra-party elections. Numerous reasons lead candidates to express 
                                                 
46 Downs 1957. 
47 Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005. 
48 Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003. 
49 Downs 1957. 
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statements of preferences that diverge from the median intra-party voter. Candidates 
face uncertainty about the exact distribution of preferences and the location of the 
median intra-party voter. Furthermore, candidates rely on internal party networks and 
factions that seek to pull their preferences away from the median position. For 
H[DPSOH&HURQVKRZVWKDWSDUW\IDFWLRQVLQ,WDO\FRQVWUDLQSDUW\OHDGHUV¶DELOLW\WR
GRPLQDWHWKHSDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQ50 'LVDJUHHPHQWVRYHUWKHSDUW\¶VEURDGVWUDWHJ\DOVR
encourage party leaders to deviate from the intra-party median position. Election 
PLQGHGOHDGHUVVHHNLQJWRDYRLGWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIODWHU³8-7XUQV´RU³IOLS-IORSV´
may try to balance their statements in anticipation of a general election. This tactic 
would cause candidates to emphasize policies that fall somewhere between the party 
DQGWKHHOHFWRUDWH¶VSUHIHUHQFHV3DUW\PHPEHUVDOVRGLVDJUHHRYHUZKHWKHUWR
emphasize pure policy goals or more incremental reforms.51 These disagreements 
manifest themselves in party leadership candidates seeking to distinguish themselves 
from their competition based on their policy statements.52  
)DFWRUVWKDWPRUHEURDGO\LQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV¶ short and long term electoral 
strategy will also manifest as intra-party disagreements. Elected officials and 
prominent party members have pre-existing reputations.53 These candidates face 
GLIILFXOWLHVLQUHVSRQGLQJWRFKDQJHVLQSXEOLFRSLQLRQRUWKHSRVLWLRQVRIWKHSDUW\¶V
                                                 
50 Ceron 2012. 
51 Kitschelt 1989. 
52 6HHIRUH[DPSOH0DU[DQG6FKXPDFKHU¶VDQDO\VLVRILQWUD-party conflict over policy rigidity 
and change in Social Democratic Parties in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain.   
53 Studies of economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier 2000), issue ownership (Green and 
Jennings 2012) and policy accountability (Carey 2009; Kam RIWHQHPSKDVL]HSDUWLHV¶DQG
OHDGHUV¶SROLF\UHSXWDWLRQV 
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electorate without appearing at odds with their reputation.54 In this context, key votes 
for the pDUW\OHDGHUVKLSSURYLGHWKHSDUW\¶VPHPEHUVKLSZLWKWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR
select between candidates with historical policy reputations and new competitors. 
Party member votes in this context serve as the way that parties negotiate difficult 
questions of policy reform and strategy in response to changing political conditions. 
Assuming that party members at congresses vote for the candidate with 
preferences closest to their own, we predict that those candidates with more extreme 
preferences gain less support from intra-party groups. Candidates closer to the 
ideological center are more likely to attract a broad range of support. Like elections 
in other arenas, alternate election rules might lead candidates to hold more diverse 
preferences.55 In our next hypothesis, we predict that the relative distance from the 
ideological center influences the amount of votes a candidate receives; 
 
H3) Candidates farther from the ideological center of the party receive less 
support than ideologically central candidates. 
 
Although we hypothesize that ideological distance generally matters for party 
leadership elections, we DOVRSUHGLFWWKDWWKHSDUW\¶VJRYHUQPHQWVtatus moderates the 
effect of candiGDWHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRISUHIHUHQFH As we predict for intra-party 
heterogeneity in our second hypothesis (H2), the consequence of deviating from the 
median are different for government and opposition parties. Government leaders are 
                                                 
54 Schumacher 2013. 
55 Carey and Shugart 1995. Elections for the French party leadership are based on a plurality election 
of the party congress, whereas elections for most positions in the SPD and the CDU use the Block 
Vote.   
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forced to respond to develop policies in response to rapidly changing world events.56 
In this context, party leaders will emphasize their success at implementing policies 
and the benefits of controlling government institutions more generally. Following 
from a principal-agent perspective, leaders can also use voter preferences to explain 
policy deviations from their stated preferences, as if party members are competing 
principals with voter groups. 57 Intra-party groups, therefore, will place greater 
ePSKDVLVRQWKHLUSROLF\UHFRUGVHYHQLIWKH\GHYLDWHIURPWKHSDUW\¶VPHGLDQ 
In contrast to government party leaders, those in the opposition have fewer 
H[WHUQDOGHPDQGVWRGHYLDWHIURPWKHSDUW\PHGLDQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHV,QVWHDGWKH\IDFH
greater incentives from within the party to adhere to the median position. On the one 
hand, opposition leaders and candidates are freed from external constraints on their 
statements of preferences. Unlike governing parties, which demand compromise 
flexibility and intra-party unity to effectively govern, opposition parties do not have a 
concurrent policy record and reputation that they must address in their policy 
statements. On the other hand, party members demand greater ideological purity in 
this context because there are fewer external incentives to govern effectively or 
responsibly.58 Without obvious policy compromises and rewards from participation 
in government, members will be less forgiving of deviations away from their 
preferences when the party is in the opposition. Instead, they primarily choose to 
support candidates espousing preferences most similar to their own. As we 
hypothesize in our second hypothesis, this increased competition emerges as 
                                                 
56 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010. 
57 Numerous studies from a principal-agent perspective argue that government leaders face demands 
from multiple competing principals.  For example see Carey 2009 or Kam 2009.  
58 Kitschelt (1989) argues that opposition parties attract more ideologically rigid activists, while 
government parties attract more pragmatic activists, seeking incremental changes. 
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different intra-party groups express a wider range of preferences. Consequently, 
uncertainty about the distribution of intra-party preferences also increases.  
Therefore, change in party leaders and broad preferences occur as the median intra-
party voter is revealed and chooses between diverse competitors in the opposition. 
More broadly, intra-party demands for specific policy goals may therefore explain 
EURDGGLIIHUHQFHVLQSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOFDPSDLJQWDFWLFVZKHQWKH\DUHLQWKH
government versus the opposition.59 Based on this logic, we predict in our final 
hypothesis that ideological proximity to the party median matters more for 
candidates from an opposition party than for candidates whose party is in 
government.  
 
H4) Government participation moderates the effect of candidate statements of 
preference. Ideological distance from the party center decreases support for 
candidates in opposition parties more than for government parties. 
 
In summary, we argue that the causes and consequences of intra-party 
SUHIHUHQFHVDUHGULYHQE\SDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOFRQWH[WDQGJRYHUQPHQWDOUROHMore 
broadly, we think that intra-party factions and party members use speeches at party 
congresses to signal their internal strength and the location of their ideal preferences. 
Individual party members speak to signal their SUHIHUHQFHVDQGWKHUHIRUHSXOOOHDGHUV¶
statements of preferences towards their own. Although, in some countries, party 
leaders control who speaks at party congresses, party delegates from France and 
Germany are free to participate at the party meetings because the party leadership 
                                                 
59 Greene 2014. 
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seeks to avoid excluding supportive groups.60 From this perspective, diverse groups 
within the party send representatives to speak on their behalf at party congresses.61 
Therefore, these speeches closely approximate the preferences of the delegates at 
these meetings and the preferences of the party membership more broadly.  In the 
next section, we describe our new data set and method of deriving positions from 
intra-party speech. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To test our hypotheses, we collect data on intra-party leadership elections and 
speeches from four parties in France and Germany. In particular, we analyze intra-
party elections and speeches from the national congresses of the Parti Socialiste 
(PS), the Union pour un Movement Populaire (UMP) in France and the Christlich 
Demokratische Union (CDU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
in Germany. These parties provide a difficult first test of our approach because of 
their similarities and differences. For example, all four parties have faced historical 
divisions, have experience in government and the opposition, are hierarchically 
organized and include strong intra-party factions.62 Likewise, for each of the parties, 
                                                 
60 In our sample, we find no obvious cases where intra-party factional groups are excluded from the 
parties.  Delegates are chosen in the PS as representatives of the regional party organizations.  In 
Germany, delegates represent are also chosen by regional organizations.  In each case, there are few 
SUDFWLFDOOLPLWDWLRQVRQWKHSDUWLHV¶UXOHVIRUOLPLWLQJVSHDNLQJULJKWV 
61 The selectorate for candidate and leadership elections GHSHQGVRQSDUWLHV¶UXOHV:KLOHPDQ\SDUWLHV
are democratizing their rules to increase the groups participating in these elections, the parties in our 
VDPSOHJLYHWKLVUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKHSDUW\¶VPHPEHUVKLSWKURXJKWKHLUGHOHJDWHVDWQDWLRQDOPHHWLQJV
)RUPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHGLYHUVLW\RISDUWLHV¶VHOHFWLRQUXOHVVHH.HQLJE 
62 Harmel and Tan 2003; Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005. 
19 
 
the primary authority for selecting candidates is the party membership.63 These 
similarities mean that our results are likely to hold for parties with comparable 
organizations and histories elsewhere. 
Despite these similarities, the parties also hold a large number of differences. 
These dissimilarities allow us to test our hypotheses using the logic of a most 
different systems research design.64 In particular, the CDU and the UMP tend to hold 
more conservative ideologies whereas the SPD and the PS both hold social 
democratic values. The ideologies of the conservative and the social democratic 
parties diverge and represent different historical constituencies.65 Broadly, the French 
and German parties also compete in largely different electoral and institutional 
frameworks. Germany is a federal, parliamentary system with a mixed-member-
proportional election rule while France is a unitary, semi-presidential system with a 
two-round runoff voting rule.66 Therefore, if we find evidence that our approach fits 
our theory for the parties then we can be somewhat confident that the differences 
between the systems do not contradict our theoretical approach.  
                                                 
63 7KHUXOHVIRUWKHVHOHFWLRQRIWKHSDUW\OHDGHUVKLSDUHIRUPXODWHGLQWKHSDUWLHV¶VWDQGLQJRUGHUV
Although, the standing orders have frequently been adapted over the last decades, the authority for 
selecting the party leadership has remained unchanged. The current rules for the CDU 
(http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/121205-statutenbroschuere.pdf, accessed 
February 2, 2014), SPD (http://www.spd.de/partei/Organisation/1658/organisationsstatut.html, 
accessed February 2, 2014), PS (http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/les-statuts-et-le-reglement-interieur, 
accessed February 2, 2014) and UMP (http://www.u-m-p.org/notre-parti/organisation, accessed 
February 2, 2014) are all available online. Also see Kenig 2009a and 2009b; Bergounioux and 
Grunberg 2005 for additional secondary discussiRQRIWKHSDUWLHV¶LQWHUQDOVHOHFWLRQUXOHV 
64 Przeworski and Teune 1970. 
65 Lipset and Rokkan 1967. 
66 Farrell 2001. 
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To construct a measure of ideological distance, we require measures of the 
location of DFWRUV¶ statements of preferences within the party. While there are 
QXPHURXVPHWKRGVRIPHDVXULQJSDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶
preferences from their behavior in government there are few options available for 
measuring the preferences of intra-party actors separate from the policy process.67 
Instead, we use a new data source that offers HVWLPDWHVRIDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDW
SDUWLHV¶QDWLRQDOPHHWLQJV  
To construct our measure, we collected transcripts of SDUWLHV¶QDWLRQDO
congresses IURPWKHSDUWLHV¶ZHEVLWHs and using the data archives of the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation (KAS) and the Jean Jaurès Fondation (JJF)68. The KAS 
provides transcripts for all CDU congresses since 1950, although only the transcripts 
from 1990 onwards are easily machine-readable. The merger of the East German 
CDU with the West German CDU in 1990 also provides a meaningful time point at 
which to begin our analysis. Transcripts for the SPD are only available online since 
2002. For the PS, the JJF archive contains machine-readable transcripts from their 
first party congress, the Alfortville Congres, in 1969 until 2000. Transcripts for the 
UMP are only available in their entirety for the 2004 Congrès du Bourget. This 
results in 453 observations that also gave speeches at the national meeting for the 
                                                 
67 Loewenberg 2008. 
68The KAS data archive can be accessed under http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8936/ and the FJJ archive 
under http://www.jean-jaures.org/Le-Centre-d-archives-socialistes/Base-de-donnees-des-debats. We 
collected the texts from these sites in April and May 2013.  We collected transcripts from the UMP 
and the SPD from their websites: http://www.u-m-p.org/notre-parti/dates-cles#2004, accessed January 
27, 2014 and http://www.spd.de/partei/Beschluesse/1896/parteitags_beschluesse.html, accessed 
February 2, 2014.  Data on French intra-party candidate votes comes from http://www.france-
politique.fr/ accessed 5/23/2013. 
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CDU and 166 observations for the SPD. We include 49 observations for party 
leadership candidate votes from 1969 to 2000 for the PS and 3 observations from 
2004 for the UMP.69 
:HGRZQORDGHGWKHWUDQVFULSWVIURPWKHIRXQGDWLRQV¶ DQGSDUWLHV¶ websites 
and converted them into plain text files.70 We then created separate files for every 
speech given by delegates at each party congress. To ensure that the speeches convey 
ideological preferences of the individual speaker, we removed all interjections and 
all speeches announcing other speakers or discussing procedural rules of the party 
congress. Our sample contains 1649 speeches from the CDU covering 23 national 
party congresses from 1990-2011, 831 speeches from the SPD covering 13 
congresses from 2002-2013, 1138 speeches from the PS covering 21 congresses from 
1969-2000 and speeches from the UMP covering one congress in 2004.  
  Having constructed our sample, we use WORDFISH71 to estimate the party 
GHOHJDWHV¶LGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQVWORDFISH is a statistical scaling model that draws 
on word frequencies to estimate policy positions in text documents.72 The underlying 
assumption of the model is that the count y of words j in a document i is distributed 
according to a Poisson distribution: 
     yij a3RLVVRQȜ ij)  
                                                 
69 The full listing of speeches at party national congresses for the UMP is only available for 2004 on 
XPSRUJ$FFHVVHG:HZHUHXQDEOHWRILQGWUDQVFULSWVRIVSHHFKHVIRUWKH803¶VSDUHQW
parties. Speeches are unavailable for party congresses following 2004.   
70 A lack of full transcripts of speeches in any format greatly limits our potential sample. 
71 Slapin and Proksch 2008. 
72 The model can implemented in the statistical programming language R using the package Austin 
developed by Will Lowe (2011). 
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7KHSDUDPHWHUȜLVWKHPHDQDQGWKHYDULDQFHRIWKHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGWDNHVWKH
following functional form: 
    Ȝ ij H[SĮi ȥj ȕj Ȧi) 
ZKHUHĮ DUHDVHWRIWH[WIL[HGHIIHFWVFRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHOHQJWKRIWKHGRFXPHQWȥLV
a set of word fixed effects controlling for words that are generally used more 
IUHTXHQWO\WKDQRWKHUVȕLVDQHVWLPDWHRIWKHZRUGVSHFLILFZHLJKWFDSWXULQJWKH
importance of word j LQGLVFULPLQDWLQJEHWZHHQSROLF\SRVLWLRQVDQGȦLVWKH
estimate of the speaker L¶Vpolicy position. We are interested in the latter two 
parameters. To identify the model, both ĮDQGWKHPHDQRIDOOVSHDNHUSRVLWLRQVLVVHW
to 0 and the standard deviation is set to 1. 
In contrast to other scaling approaches such as WORDSCORES,73 
WORDFISH does not require reference documents with known positions on 
predefined policy dimensions. It only requires that the documents used in the 
DQDO\VLVUHIOHFWWKHDXWKRUV¶SROLF\SRVLWLRQRQDVLQJOHGLPHQVLRQ:HHVWLPDWH
separate models for each party and each party congress using all meaningful 
speeches as data. We therefore expect that the dimension underlying the data 
corresponds to a basic left-right policy dimension. 74 Before we scale the documents 
we prepare the data by removing stop words, numbers, punctuation and words that 
appear in nearly all of the documents. We also apply the German and French Porter 
stemming algorithm to reduce words to their word stems.  
                                                 
73 Laver et al. 2003. 
74 Given our interest in the relative location and distance from the median position for each congress, 
we are indifferent to the substantive content of the underlying dimension so long as it represents the 
primary form of contention within the party.  See the Appendix for a discussion of the content of the 
underlying dimension. 
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After applying the model, WORDFISH returns position estimates for each 
document text. Figure 1 displays the positions of some prominent members of the PS 
from the 2000 national party congress in Grenoble. The black dots are the position 
estimates of the speakers listed on the y-axis and the lines around the dots are 95 
percent confidence intervals. The distribution of estimates suggests that the positions 
of these speakers were quite divided during the party congress. The range of 
positions shown goes from Lionel Jospin on the right to Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the 
very left of the dimension. The other delegates have positions near or just left or right 
of the ideological center.  
 
Fig. 1. Positions of PS speakers 
 
Taken at face value, we argue that these estimates appear internally valid. In 
particular, we might expect that the speeches given by the party chief François 
Hollande, Pierre Mauroy and Laurent Fabius should be relatively close as they all 
supported the motion proposed by Prime Minister Jospin. Similarly, we would expect 
WKDW+HQUL(PPDQXHOOLDQG&KULVWLDQ%DWDLOOHZRXOGEHUDQNHGWRWKHOHIWRI-RVSLQ¶V
supporters. Emmanuelli and %DWDLOOHVWURQJO\FULWLFL]HGWKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶V
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business-IULHQGO\VRFLDOSROLFLHVDQGIRXQGHGDIDFWLRQHQWLWOHG³'emocracy and 
(TXDOLW\´Démocratie - Égalité) that called for more anti-capitalist policies. 
Similarly, an accurate measure of policy preferences would also rank Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon further to the left of Emmanuelli and Bataille as he represented the most 
extreme faction, the Socialist Left (Gauche Socialiste). This faction also opposed 
Jospin and demanded radical reforms to counter treats of globalization (Bergounioux 
and Grunberg 2005).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Emmanuelli and Mélenchon later founded a common 
faction called the New World (Nouveau monde). Furthermore, Mélenchon left the PS 
LQWRIRXQGWKH3DUWLGH*DXFKH3*LQUHVSRQVHWR6pJROqQH5R\DO¶VYLFWRU\DW
the 2008 party leadership election. The positions of the speakers illustrated in Figure 
1 FRUUHVSRQGFORVHO\WRWKHVSHDNHUV¶UHVSHFWLYHIDFWLRQs. Jospin, Hollande, Mauroy 
and Fabius are all close to the center or just to the right of it. Emmanuelli and 
Bataille are slightly left of the center and Mélenchon is farther to the left.  
Like the example presented in Figure 1, we estimate separate WORDFISH 
models for each national congress. We then test our first and second hypotheses 
using a measure of intra-party disagreement based on the WORDFISH estimates. In 
particular, to determine whether intra-party disagreement increases after parties 
suffer electoral losses for government positions we calculate the total variance of 
DFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUHDFKQDWLRQDOFRQJUHVV:HWKHQXVHWKLVYDULDQFHDVWKH
dependent variable in our second analysis.  
The primary independent variables predicting intra-party heterogeneity are 
electoral success, government experience, and economic conditions. We 
operationalize electoral success as the change in the percentage vote the party 
received in the following national parliamentary elections. We also include the 
percentage vote for presidential elections in France (treating this variable as zero for 
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German parties). Similarly, we operationalize experience in government using a 
dummy variable indicating whether the party is part of the governing cabinet or 
controls the presidency in France (treating this variable as zero for German parties). 
We then include an interaction of government incumbency with the change in annual 
GDP growth from the OECD.75  
As our second dependent variable, we use the percentage vote for party 
leadership candidates at party national congresses. For the CDU and the SPD, we use 
the total percentage of votes that each party leadership candidate received during a 
national congress. The CDU leadership consists of the party leader, the general 
secretary, four deputy leaders, seven party chairs and 26 extended board members. 
7KH63'¶VOHDGHUVKLSIROORZVDVLPLODUVWUXFWXUHLQFOXGLQJWKHSDUW\OHDGHUJHQHUDO
secretary, five deputy leaders and 42 extended board members. While elections for 
the top leadership positions for both parties are frequently uncontested votes of 
affirmation, elections for the extended board frequently face greater contestation. 
Like the deputy leaders and party chairs, the extended board members are elected 
using a Block Vote, or at-large plurality, system in which each voter can cast votes 
for as many candidates as there are positions available.76 This system potentially 
allows a majority group, even if it is barely a majority, to control 100 percent of the 
positions. Carey and Shugart explain that this form of voting encourages candidates 
LQQDWLRQDOHOHFWLRQVWRGHYHORSWKHLUSHUVRQDOUHSXWDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHIDFWLRQ¶V
reputation, as the district magnitude increases.77  
                                                 
75 For additional information on the WORDFISH technique and additional robustness checks see the 
RQOLQH$SSHQGL[DWWKHDXWKRU¶VZHEVLWHhttp://zacgreene.com/. 
76 According to the IDEA, Block Voting systems are used in federal elections in the Falkland Islands, 
Guernsey, Isle of Man, the Maldives, Mauritius, Montserrat, Saint Helena, and Syria. 
77 Carey and Shugart 1995. 
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Because the French parties, the PS and the UMP, vote for a slate of 
FDQGLGDWHVRUD³PRWLRQ´UDWKHUWKDQfor a candidate, we use the total percentage of 
votes that each motion received during a national congress. Each motion includes a 
series of policy proposals for the platform and a list of leaders. For each motion, we 
identify the main initiator and future party leader and add the total percentage of 
votes that the motion received.78  
We use the percentage votes for the candidates for the German parties and for 
each motion submitted in the French parties as the dependent variable in our second 
set of analyses. We then use our WORDFISH estimates to create a distance measure 
by calculating the absolute distance between the position of each candidate (initiator) 
and the median position of speakers at each party congress.79 We also include some 
controls that have been found to be important in studies of electoral politics. We 
include dummy variables for whether the speaker has held the office before for the 
German parties and a dummy variable for each type of leadership position. We also 
LQFOXGHDGXPP\YDULDEOHIRUWKHFDQGLGDWHV¶JHQGHUWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHSDUW\¶V
gender quota requiring that one third of the board be female. We then include a 
dummy variable for the PS and UMP if the motion is supported by the current party 
leader.  
 
ANALYSIS I:  INTRA-PARTY DISAGREEMENT 
 
                                                 
78 For most motions this is easy because they are generally referred to by the initiator of the motion 
that will be the new party leader if the motion is successful.  
79 Our results are robust to using the mean or median position.  
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Our first hypotheses predict that intra-party disagreement increases with 
electoral losses DQGSDUWLHV¶H[SHULHQFHLQWKHRSSRVLWLRQ. The results from our 
analysis indicate support for the hypotheses, although the total number of party 
congresses limits our ability to perform extensive regression analysis for any 
individual party. As a preliminary demonstration of our theory, we present graphical 
evidence for each party.  
 
Fig. 2. Intra-Party Disagreement CDU 
Figure 2 GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHYDULDQFHRIVSHDNHUVDWWKH&'8¶VQDWLRQDO
congresses. While the CDU was in opposition and faced decreasing levels of 
disagreement from 1998 to 2005, the levels of disagreement immediately increased 
IROORZLQJWKH&'8¶VHOHFWRUDOYLFWRU\Ln that year. However, disagreement decreased 
in the party congress in 2008 before returning to higher levels after the general 
election in 2009. Furthermore, the overall trend is somewhat static prior to 1998 and 
increasing following 2005, while the trend for disagreement is decreasing from 1998 
to 2005. 
As Figure 3 shows, the SPD follows a similar post election trend as the CDU. 
Prior to the election in 2009, the SPD participated in coalitions with the Green party 
(prior to 2005) and then with the CDU. Their exclusion from government after 11 
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years in 2009 was followed by a large increase in disagreement as the SPD sought to 
wrestle with their new situation as an opposition party. Observers suggested at this 
WLPHWKDWWKH63'ZRXOGKDYHWR³UHLQYHQWLWVHOI´ E\³UHVROYLQJELWWHULQWHUQDO
GLVSXWHVEHWZHHQHFRQRPLFUHIRUPV«DQGWKHSDUW\¶VSRZHUIXOOHIWZLQJ´80 
 
 
Fig. 3. Intra-Party Disagreement SPD 
 
The graphical results for the PS illustrated in Figure 4 also indicate evidence 
for the theory. The amount of disagreement for the PS varied substantially prior to 
WKHSDUW\¶VYLFWRU\81 In contrast to the CDU, disagreement sharply decreased 
between the party congress prior to the election and the extraordinary party congress 
immediately following their electoral victory in 1981. Over the following decades, 
the PS controlled both the Presidency and the Prime Minister for large portions of 
WLPH7KURXJKRXWWKLVSHULRGWKH36¶SDUW\FRQJUHVVHVH[KLELWDJHQHUDOWUHQGRI
increased disagreement. 
                                                 
80 ³$1HZ%X]]IRU*HUPDQ\´ 
81 The large shifts prior to 1981 likely reflect the changing composition of the party as numerous 
factions joined or exited the party.   
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Fig. 4. Intra-Party Disagreement PS 
 
To directly test the first set of hypotheses, we predict the amount of variance 
DWSDUW\QDWLRQDOFRQJUHVVHVEDVHGRQWKHSDUWLHV¶H[SHULHQFHLQJRYHUQPHQW:HILUVW
conduct separate analyses before testing the relationship in a combined model. 
Despite the small number of observations (24, 12, and 19), our analyses yield 
evidence consistent with our theory.82  
In the first hypothesis, we predict that intra-party disagreement increases after 
an electoral loss. Despite the descriptive evidence, Table 1 shows only weak support 
for this hypothesis. For the German parties and the combined analysis in Table 1, 
having lost control of government leads to an increase in disagreement, but the 
coefficient is only significant for the SPD in Model 2. The coefficient is in the wrong 
direction for the PS. The coefficient for the change in the percent parliamentary vote 
the parties receive is in the correct direction for the CDU, the PS and in the 
Combined model, but is in the wrong direction and significant for the SPD. The 
                                                 
82 Due to the small number of observations, direct interpretation of the significance for the individual 
party tests should be treated with caution.  We also include the estimates for the one party congress 
from the UMP in Model 4.  Excluding the UMP leads to substantively similar inferences. 
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coefficient for losing control of the presidency in France is only in the correct 
direction in Model 8, but never reaches statistical significance. Overall, there is at 
best weak evidence that losing an election leads to increased disagreement based on 
these estimates (H1)7KLVPLJKWUHIOHFW+DUPHODQG-DQGD¶V perspective that only 
major electoral losses lead to broad intra-party change.83  
Table 1 Disagreement at Party National Congresses 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 CDU 
 
SPD PS  Combined
84
 
Government Party 0.292 0.015 -0.143 0.059 
 (0.207) (0.342) (0.196) (0.128) 
¨ % GDP Growth -0.888 14.084** 4.037 9.434** 
 (6.341) (3.502) (3.506) (2.709) 
Government Party X 
¨ % GDP Growth 
-0.501 -18.362+ -3.481 -10.346* 
(7.305) (8.994) (13.288) (4.281) 
Lost Government 0.288 1.677* -0.315 0.161 
 (0.200) (0.601) (0.350) (0.204) 
¨ % Parliamentary Vote -0.004 0.074* -0.023 -0.011 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.009) 
Lost Presidency   -0.004 0.008 
   (0.009) (0.006) 
¨ % Presidential Vote   0.045 0.085 
   (0.194) (0.109) 
PS dummy    -0.339* 
    (0.133) 
SPD dummy    -0.204 
    (0.158) 
UMP dummy    -0.309 
    (0.391) 
Constant 1.552*** 1.537** 1.543*** 1.712*** 
 (0.103) (0.318) (0.173) (0.115) 
R2 0.080 0.766 0.310 0.266 
Root Means Squared 
Error 
0.539 0.314 0.285 0.418 
AIC 41.535 7.962 9.808 66.877 
BIC 47.426 10.387 16.420 85.105 
Observations 24 12 19 56 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
                                                 
83 Harmel and Janda 1994. 
84 Model 8 pools the observations from Model 1, 2 and 3, but also includes the one UMP party 
congress from 2004. Excluding the UMP leads to nearly identical results. 
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We demonstrate somewhat stronger evidence in support of the second 
hypothesis in Table 1. In particular, we argue that the economy influences the 
internal politics of parties, particularly when they are in the opposition (H2a). The 
FRHIILFLHQWVIRUWKHLQWHUDFWLRQRIFKDQJHLQSHUFHQW*'3JURZWKDQGWKHSDUW\¶V
government status are in the expected direction for the SPD, PS and the Combined 
models, and statistically significant for the SPD and the Combined test. Importantly, 
the constitutive term for change in percent GDP growth is positive in these models; 
opposition parties face increased disagreement under stronger economic growth. The 
magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction suggests that government parties may 
decrease their internal disagreement as the economy grows, but the combined effect 
does not reach statistical significance. This evidence is consistent with our prediction 
for government parties in our second hypothesis (H2b). 
 
Fig. 5. Predicted effect of the economy on intra-party disagreement.85 
                                                 
85 The solid line in Figure 5 is the median predicted intra-party disagreement. The dashed lines are the 
95 percent confidence intervals based on simulations using 1,000 draws from the estimated variance-
covariance matrix from Model 4 in Table 1. Values for the independent variables are set such that the 
predicted effects are for an opposition party that has not changed its vote or government status in the 
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
D
e
n
s
it
y
.5
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
-.05 0 .05 .1
Change in % GDP growth
Predicted Effect of change in % GDP growth
When the party is in the Opposition
32 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of economic growth. As the rate of growth 
increases for opposition parties, intra-party disagreement increases. An increase of 
one standard deviation in percent GDP Growth increases disagreement by .255 or a 
16% increase to the mean level of disagreement. This increase likely reflects 
infighting over control of the party when the leaders expect the party to perform 
poorly. Disagreement arises when intra-party groups believe that the current 
leadership is performing poorly. In summary, these results suggest that electoral 
success may cause parties to act more coherently, but that opposition parties divide 
when they perceive their current leadership to have failed. This evidence is consistent 
with our second hypothesis.  
 
ANALYSIS II:  IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY AND LEADERSHIP 
SELECTION 
According to hypotheses H3 and H4, candidates for the party leadership will 
gain more votes from intra-party groups when they are more ideologically central, 
but that ideological distance is less important with the party is in government. To test 
these hypotheses, we run separate regression analyses using Ordinary Least Squares 
regression with robust standard errors for each party first and then in a combined 
model with random effects that we present in Table 2.86 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
last election. The dotted line in is the distribution of change in GDP growth rate and refers to the right 
hand side axis. 
86 We include random effects to account for differences between party congresses. We find 
substantively similar results using fixed effects, or cluster the standard errors using the party congress 
as the id variable. 
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Table 2 Percent Vote in Intra-Party Elections 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 CDU SPD PS 
 
Combined  
 
Ideological 
Distance 
1.085 -6.128* -5.825* -1.524+ 
(1.294) (2.822) (2.493) (0.832) 
Government Party 0.507 -8.241+ -5.706 -1.232 
(2.198) (4.534) (13.124) (3.638) 
Government Party 
X Ideological 
Distance 
-0.545 5.754+ 9.100 2.457+ 
(1.741) (3.452) (13.995) (1.463) 
Male -1.866 -0.824 7.927* -0.788 
(1.237) (2.392) (3.034) (1.530) 
Incumbent Leader 2.222+ 5.583* 56.140*** 4.325*** 
(1.322) (2.440) (6.749) (1.216) 
Member of 
Parliament 
1.896 -0.808 3.414 0.921 
(1.285) (2.273) (3.754) (1.163) 
General Secretary 
(CDU and SPD) 
-3.628 -20.798***  -9.942*** 
(2.474) (5.377)  (2.825) 
Deputy Leaders 
(CDU and SPD) 
-13.633*** -8.307*  -10.913*** 
(2.230) (3.836)  (1.744) 
Party Chairs 
(CDU only) 
-25.127***   -26.460*** 
(2.323)   (3.003) 
Extended Board 
(CDU and SPD) 
-19.498*** -38.741***  -25.277*** 
(1.506) (3.185)  (2.585) 
Single Ballot 
(France) 
   -61.765*** 
   (4.787) 
Constant 89.610*** 97.417*** 9.380* 91.219*** 
(2.758) (5.673) (3.886) (2.957) 
R2 0.141 0.482 0.754  
Root Means 
Squared Error 
13.010 13.685 16.012 15.865 
AIC 3628.959 1349.374 406.890 . 
BIC 3674.258 1380.494 418.117 . 
Observations 454 166 48 671 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate some support for the theory. In particular, 
ideological distance is in the correct direction for most of the models. Consistent 
with our third hypothesis (H3), we find that greater ideological distance from the 
SDUW\¶VLGHRORJLFDOFHQWHUZill lead candidates to receive a smaller percentage of the 
vote. In particular, the coefficients are negative and significant for the SPD and the 
PS as well as in the full sample in Model 8. Furthermore, the effect of ideological 
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distance depends on the paUW\¶VVWDWXVLQJRYHUQPHQWDVWKHfourth hypothesis (H4) 
predicts. Consistent with our theory, the coefficient for the interaction of government 
status and distance is positive in three of the models and significant for the SPD and 
the full sample. This indicates that ideological distance has a different effect for 
parties in government. Participation in government causes the effect of distance to 
disappear as the combined coefficients are no longer significant. As the second 
hypothesis predicts, candidates in government parties are insulated from the negative 
effects of their statements.  
 
Fig. 6. Predicted effect of ideological distance on percentage candidate vote in the SPD.87 
 
                                                 
87 The solid line in Figure 6 is the median predicted change in the percentage vote a candidates 
receives. The dashed lines are the 90 percent confidence intervals based on simulations using 1,000 
draws from the estimated variance-covariance matrix from Model 6 in Table 2. Values for the 
independent variables are set such that the predicted effects are for a first time female candidate 
running for a position on the SPD Extended Board that is not a member of parliament when the party 
is in the opposition. The dotted line is the density of candidate distances and refers to the right hand 
side axis. 
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We present this effect graphically in Figure 6 for candidates in the SPD when 
it is in the opposition. The graph shows that more ideologically distance candidates 
gain fewer votes than more central candidates. In particular, a decrease of one 
standard deviation in ideological distance increases the candidate¶s vote by nearly 4 
percent for candidates in the SPD when it is in the opposition.  
The control variables in the first set of analyses are mostly in the predicted 
directions. Men hold an advantage in the PS, but not in the German parties. The 
difference between these parties may be unsurprising since France only adopted 
quota laws in 2000.88 Incumbent candidates earn more support than non-incumbents. 
Members of parliament also benefit from their position in office in the PS and the 
CDU, but not the SPD, although the coefficient is never significant. Finally, the 
dummy variables for the position type also suggest that candidates for lower level 
positions in the German parties gain a smaller percentage of votes than the 
candidates for the top leadership position.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The results from our analysis provide support for our hypotheses on intra-
party politics. Using speeches at party national congresses to measure the preferences 
of intra-party actors, we find that party leaders with more divergent preferences 
attract less support from intra-party elections in the SPD and the PS, but more 
support in the CDU. However, party leaders are generally isolated or protected from 
their statements when the party participates in government. These results hold up in a 
pooled analysis with additional data fURPWKH8033DUWLHV¶H[SHULHQFHVLQ
government also influence the range of disagreement, although there is at best 
                                                 
88 .URRNDQG2¶%ULHQDQG 
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limited evidence that electoral losses increase intra-party disagreements. Instead, 
disagreements arise most strongly when opposition parties are perceived as 
incompetent or unaccountable such as when economic growth increases. 
Our analysis provides supportive evidence for numerous studies of party 
politics. In particular, while party leadHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVPD\EHFORVHUWRWKHSDUW\¶V
median position, intra-party preferences vary greatly and systematically, depending 
RQWKHSDUW\¶VH[SHULHQFHLQJRYHUQPHQW$VPRXQWLQJUHVHDUFKVKRZV89 scholars 
should be wary of assuming that this intra-party preference variation does not 
LQIOXHQFHWKHSDUW\¶VHOHFWLRQDQGJRYHUQPHQWDOEHKDYLRU,QWUD-party heterogeneity 
OLNHO\LQIOXHQFHVWKHGHJUHHRIFRKHVLRQEHWZHHQWKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVDQGWKHLUDELOLW\
to negotiate with potential coalition partners or on policy agreements. Our analysis of 
intra-party disagreement also provides researchers with a mechanism to study the 
HIIHFWRIUXOHVRQSDUWLHV¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\GLVFLSOLQHE\LQGLFDWLQJWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
members act cohesively at the intra-party level. By systematically studying intra-
party elections we show one way in which intra-party groups may be able to resolve 
their disputes, through votes at national congresses.  
Despite the small number of party congresses and the large ideological and 
institutional differences between the German and French parties, our results 
demonstrate that speeches at party national congresses provide useful information 
DERXWWKHUHODWLYHORFDWLRQRIDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV2XUDSSURDFKSURYLGHVDPRUH
direct means of measuring actoUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVEDVHGRQWKHLURZQVWDWHPHQWVLQD
setting that is distinct from their behavior in office. However, we caution scholars 
against making overly large generalizations from our limited sample. Our case 
selection included parties competing in widely different institutional settings, but 
                                                 
89 See for example Kenig 2009b; Ceron 2012; Lehrer 2012. 
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there are also a number of similarities in the German and French parties which limit 
the external validity of our study.  We are uncertain whether parties with different 
organizations or which have never participated in government act in similar ways.  
Also, alternate national or intra-party electoral rules might lead to different 
outcomes. We expect that future analyses would benefit greatly from the systematic 
collection and analysis of party congresses in a comparative, cross-national 
framework. By analyzing intra-party politics we hope to break open the black box of 
intra-party politics and gain deeper insights into the political process. Using these 
estimates, we hope that scholars of parliamentary behavior and public policy will be 
able to improve their ability to predict a wide range of behaviors and outcomes, such 
as coalition formation and termination, the number and type of public policies, and 
government oversight behaviors, without the fear that their estimates are endogenous 
to the processes they are seeking to study.  
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